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ABSTRACT 
 
Knowledge and understanding of the law by the citizens of a state is crucial for the 
legitimacy of governance. There are many examples of legal knowledge deficits, e.g., the 
lack of legal knowledge of the European Union in its citizens. In order to provide them 
with understandable and reliable information about the legal framework underlying the 
European Union, it is necessary to determine how this knowledge deficit can be remedied 
effectively. Large on-line collaborative environments offer unique opportunities to jointly 
build a body of knowledge concerning a specific topic. However, these environments 
feature pitfalls that have to be avoided in legal knowledge dissemination. A reputation 
system can guard the environment against ‘vandalism’ (destroying others’ contributions) 
and unreliable or false contributions, by, for instance, letting participants assess each 
other’s contributions. This article will investigate how a reputation system can improve 
the quality of collaboration in legal knowledge dissemination. It does so by using 
‘applied legal epistemology’ – a framework to assess knowledge relevant to legal 
domains by practical translations of epistemic criteria – to build a theoretically sound 
reputation system. This reputation system, in its turn, is meant to optimize the 
implementation of a theory of legal knowledge dissemination. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Legal knowledge dissemination is a complex task. It requires not only profound 
knowledge of the underlying legal system, but also a very clear picture of how to 
communicate such knowledge. Therefore, it presupposes interdisciplinary collaboration. Such 
collaboration can take place through the internet. One of the advantages of using the internet 
is the possibility of initiating larger-scale collaboration, but such collaboration requires proper 
guidance in order to be effective. Such guidance can be provided by a reputation system, 
allowing assessment of each other’s contributions. 
Wikipedia, the internet encyclopaedia, is probably the most well-known example of user-
generated content, serving information requests of millions of people, and built entirely by 
essentially the same group that uses it. Wikipedia has not been without criticisms, focusing on 
vandalism (deleting or ‘damaging’ proper information pages) and unreliability (e.g. because 
of contributors without recognized knowledge in a certain area). Attempts to improve quality 
by ‘closing’ certain contributions for editing or editorial supervision have up to now not 
yielded a new platform that is as successful (in terms of sheer size) as the original Wikipedia.  
Still, Wikipedia’s successes and failures are of major importance to any community-built 
information database, and thus, also to legal knowledge dissemination. Making use of the 
achievements of web-based collaboration technologies can help answer the question how the 
knowledge deficit can be (partially) eliminated. The article uses legal knowledge 
dissemination as an example case of how an interdisciplinary community could regulate itself 
by introducing and changing rules of co-operation and assessment. 
 
 
1.1. Knowledge and the Legitimacy of Law 
 
To be a citizen is to know one’s role, rights and duties in a society. The much-used 
saying that every citizen ‘ought to know the law’ is a fiction (Voermans 2004) – useful, for 
example, for the attribution of responsibility – but its fictitiousness also presents a huge risk 
for the legitimacy of governance. The body of legal rules, case law and literature has grown to 
such substantial proportions that any person without a legal education will get lost in the 
multitude and sheer volume of formal sources of law (legislation, case law, treaties and 
customary law). This cannot be changed by simply making these sources accessible through 
the internet, because mere textual information does not suffice for legal knowledge 
dissemination.  
The legal system is the backbone of modern society. It establishes the conditions under 
which people can do business, how they should behave, and what rights they have. If law is 
instrumental to doing one’s duties as a citizen, at least one should have the possibility of 
mastering the relevant knowledge. An example of a deficit in relevant legal knowledge was 
established in the research project ANITA (an acronym for ‘administrative normative 
information transaction agents’). As a part of this project, empirical research was done into 
police officers’ knowledge about the regulation of the distribution and exchange of police 
data. It appeared that there are often shortcomings in such knowledge (Koelewijn and 
Kielman, 2006).  
Communities for Legal Knowledge Dissemination 
 
117 
Additionally, current accessibility of sources of law does not suffice to serve citizens and 
non-legal professionals. In the Netherlands, sources of law are indeed made available on-line, 
but they are not linked in a meaningful way. As for the European Union, there are extensive 
information services, which are indeed linked to each other. But they still only serve those 
who know their way around these services, and who have sufficient background to understand 
the nature of the European legal order. Additionally, there are relations between European 
legislation and national legislation. These connections are not explained as a part of existing 
European information portals (such as EUR-lex) in a meaningful manner to publics without a 
legal education.  
 
 
1.2. Legal Knowledge Dissemination 
 
Dissemination of legal knowledge should take into account specific abilities and interests 
of the publics involved. The normative nature of the law introduces new challenges in 
developing such a view: do individual and group attitudes towards certain norms influence 
the possibility of legal knowledge dissemination? The same goes for the complexity of the 
legal system: how can someone understand at least the relevant consequences for their 
situation of a specific part of the law without mastering the outlines of the legal system as a 
whole, and the content of and interaction between legal sources?  
Many modern legal systems, including the ‘Acquis’ underlying the European Union, are 
very much like ‘virtual cathedrals’; enormous construction of legislative instruments. Just 
making accessible all the instruments and procedures by themselves will not provide citizens 
with sufficient insight. In order to attain such insight, well-founded methods of disseminating 
legal knowledge to the public are needed.  
The hypothesis underlying this article is that there has to be a translation of legal 
information both in terms of the literal content of legal documents – that are often written in 
the kind of prose that is not readable for the non-legally educated – and the specific goals 
with which publics utilize that information. Moreover, considering the complex structure of 
legal instruments and the multitude of documents applicable to even the simplest of 
situations, there has to be mapping of multiple legal sources to, preferably, a single piece of 
information or advice. In order to attain this, the necessary collaboration of legal and 
communication professionals on the one hand, and information users (citizens, consumers 
etc.) on the other hand, has to be guided properly. This is where on-line collaboration can be 
managed by instruments derived from ‘applied legal epistemology’. 
 
 
2. A TRANSLATION METHOD FOR  
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION 
 
A model for translating sources of law into understandable information requires detailed 
knowledge about both the constituents of the legal domain under scrutiny and the background 
and attitudes of the dissemination public. Although some parts of the model presented can 
probably be generalized to other legal systems, the entire analysis in this article is restricted to 
the Dutch legal system. Especially the interpretation of sources of law depends on the legal 
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system under scrutiny. Any translation of formal sources of law into more understandable 
texts will yield a risk of explanation flaws and wrong interpretations. As only formal sources 
of law constitute valid law, making explicit references to the relevant parts of the original 
legal documents is probably the best strategy to solve this lack of reliability of any translated 
legal information. In this section, we first discuss the translation model (subsection 2.1). 
Subsequently, we elaborate on the separate steps that have to be taken in order to produce an 
understandable text for a specific public (subsection 2.2). An example of an actual 
‘translation’ is also given (subsection 2.3). 
 
 
2.1. Outline of the Translation Model 
 
The graphical representation of the legal knowledge dissemination model presented in 
this article resembles an hourglass. The point where the two triangles meet is where the 
translation (T) should take place. In the figure, several examples of elements and factors 
playing a role in the translation are given. They are not meant as limitative lists.  
 
growth
meaning
language
specialism
material sources of law
formal sources of law
domain structure
institutions
knowledge
reciprocity
attitude
goals
textual info
web-sites
schemas
forums
legal domain to be explained
dissemination public
topoi
norms
case law
legislation
rules
advice
directives
guidelines
T
 
 
The top triangle shows elements that constitute (valid) law in a legal domain: material 
sources of law (unofficial sources of law, such as political opinions, socio-economic situation 
etc.), formal sources of law (these are the official sources of valid law: legislation, case law, 
treaties and customary law), the structure of a domain (e.g. priority rules for the application of 
legislation and case law, references between sources, exception structures etc.), and the 
institutions playing a role therein (promulgating institutions, judicial institutions etc.). The 
bottom triangle shows examples of knowledge dissemination modalities: rules, advice, 
directives and guidelines. These modalities concern the way in which the dissemination 
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activity is presented: e.g. informal or binding. The scope of the communication can vary from 
personal advice to mass communication, and anything in between.  
Returning to the top triangle, on its left, there are some concrete examples of sources of 
law: topoi (subjects such as ‘reasonableness’, that play an important role as reference points 
in the interpretation of law), norms (rules with a normative nature), case law, and legislation. 
On the right of the top triangle, there are examples of characteristics of legal domains that 
complicate legal knowledge dissemination. Legal systems are artificial, which has 
consequences for the degree to which legal documents can be understood. Growth, meaning, 
language and specialism play a role in this. dingen hieronder korter toegelicht dan boven 
Growth. Despite the call for a decrease of administrative burdens, legal systems have a 
natural tendency to expand. New legislation is issued, whereas existing rules remain in force. 
The body of case law expands. The more rules the system contains, the less transparent it will 
probably become.  
Meaning. Many legal terms have a constructed meaning, sometimes having hardly any 
relation with the ‘common sense’ meaning of the same term. Legal documents should always 
be read with the specific context-based (artificial) meaning of such terms in mind; cf. 
Mommers and Voermans (2005).  
Language. Legal language use includes the use of complex grammatical structures and 
archaic phrases. These are common as a form of legal jargon, not taking account the 
readability for non-lawyers.  
Specialism. ‘The law’ has encountered such a degree of specialization that only 
specialized lawyers can say something sensible about a certain area of law. For each of these 
areas, specific background knowledge is needed.  
On the left of the bottom triangle, there are some examples of the forms that 
dissemination can take: textual information, web-sites, schemas and forums. On the right of 
the bottom triangle, there are factors that should play a role in the translation of sources of 
law for a specific dissemination public: background knowledge, reciprocity, attitudes and 
goals. I elaborate a bit further on these four factors.  
Knowledge. Background knowledge of the dissemination group can occur both in terms 
of being well-educated in general or having prior legal knowledge. It plays an important role 
in how to approach the target persons, e.g. in determining what additional knowledge is 
needed and how the dissemination activity can relate to knowledge already present.  
Reciprocity. Rules that originate only from structuring goals are often hard to understand 
for individual citizens. Reciprocity refers to the phenomenon that people are willing to do 
things for a different person or institution, in an abstract form of ‘compensation’ (quid pro 
quo). If the goal of a rule is not clear because of a lack of ‘built-in’ reciprocity, the tendency 
to understand, let alone to follow such a rule will decrease. For an extensive account of 
reciprocity, cf. Pessers (1999).  
Attitude. The attitudes of the dissemination public determine, e.g.,  the degree to which a 
public puts an interest in an area of law, or in a certain dissemination activity. Other examples 
of attitudes are curiosity and ignorance.  
Goals. Goals of a dissemination public are the specific aims the public tries to attain with 
respect to a legal area. Goals can range from acquiring knowledge to knowing whether a 
certain activity is legal or closing a contract with a different party. Other examples of goals 
are active compliance, avoiding legal problems, satisfying curiosity etc.  
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2.2. Translation Steps 
 
Information implicitly present in the legal domain to be explained should be made 
explicit before the actual translation can take place. At the same time, making all implicit 
information explicit would be very time and resource consuming, if not impossible. As a 
consequence, legal domain specialists need to be involved in the translation process for 
making information explicit, and communications specialists need to be involved in order to 
impose restrictions on that activity. The translation process is thus assumed to consist of 
different phases: the restriction determination phase, the expansion phase, the strategy 
determination phase, and the translation phase.  
The restriction determination phase takes into account the four factors relevant to legal 
knowledge dissemination. This phase involves determining the background knowledge of the 
dissemination public regarding the particular subject of legal knowledge dissemination, 
identifying communication goals for the particular instance of legal knowledge dissemination, 
identifying goals of the dissemination public regarding the particular subject of legal 
knowledge dissemination, and identifying attitudes of the dissemination public towards the 
particular subject of legal knowledge dissemination.  
The expansion phase concerns making explicit ‘hidden’ information, such as the priority 
relations between different sources of law, exceptions to rules, and rules that can be derived 
from, for instance, authoritative case law. Additionally, in the expansion phase terms should 
be identified that have a meaning that differs from their use in everyday language. These 
deviant meanings should be made explicit.  
The strategy determination phase involves both determining the modality of legal 
knowledge dissemination and the type of communication used for legal knowledge 
dissemination. Modalities determine the ‘tone of voice’ of the communication: whether the 
communication has the form of advice, behavioural rules, guidelines, obligations or 
prohibitions. The type of communication used for legal knowledge dissemination towards the 
dissemination public can, e.g., be texts or schemas, in the form of brochures or a web-site, or 
in the form of personal advice.  
The translation phase encompasses the selection of relevant information from the 
expanded body of legal information determined in the expansion phase, by checking what 
information is needed considering the outcomes of the restriction determination phase. With 
the approach chosen in the strategy determination phase in mind, the selected legal 
information has to be translated into understandable information. The understandability has 
now, to a certain degree, been guaranteed by taking into account specific characteristics of the 
dissemination public. 
 
[A]  Restriction determination phase:  
1) identifying communication goals for the particular instance of legal knowledge 
dissemination; 
2) identifying goals of the dissemination public regarding the particular subject of 
legal knowledge dissemination; 
3) identifying attitudes of the dissemination public towards the particular subject of 
legal knowledge dissemination; 
4) determining the background knowledge of the dissemination public regarding 
the particular subject of legal knowledge dissemination. 
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[B]  Expansion phase: 
5) for a particular domain, making implicit information explicit, such as 
information regarding, e.g.: 
a. priority of different sources of law; 
b. exceptions to rules; 
c. generalized rules from relevant case law; 
6) identifying legal concepts – terms whose meanings differ from everyday 
meaning – and making these meaning differences explicit. 
[C]  Strategy determination phase:  
7) determining the modality of legal knowledge dissemination (the ‘tone of voice’: 
advice, behavioural rules, guidelines); 
8) determining the type of communication used for legal knowledge dissemination 
towards the dissemination public (e.g. texts, schemas, in brochures or on a web-
site). 
[D]  Translation phase:  
9) selection of relevant rules from the expanded information from phase [B] in 
accordance with the restrictions from phase [A]; 
10) translation of the resulting rule set in accordance with phase [C]. 
 
 
2.3. A translation Example 
 
An extended example of the application of this translation model can be found in 
Mommers, Koelewijn and Kielman 2007. It concerns the regulation of the distribution of 
police data from the severe crime databases (hereinafter: SCD), and is repeated below. It 
concerns a specific public, not the general public. Therefore, it represents an example of the 
necessity of taking a target public into account in legal knowledge dissemination. The 
example itself does not involve the use of a collaborative workspace – it only represents the 
application of the dissemination method. The basic entity to be translated is a part of an act 
concerning the possibilities of exchanging police data. Article 13a paragraphs 2 and 3 from 
the Police Data Act (hereinafter: PDA) state a specific rule for the distribution of data from 
the SCD and an exception to that rule. Please note that the mere translation from Dutch into 
English already presents considerable problems regarding meaning, which will be ignored in 
this article. 
 
Art. 13a Police Data Act (PDA) 
 
Paragraph 2 
“Data from a severe crime database about persons as meant in the first paragraph, 
subparagraph c, will be only distributed in accordance with art. 13b, second paragraph up to 
and including the fourth paragraph. No data will be distributed under art. 18, third 
paragraph concerning persons indicated in the first paragraph, subparagraphs a and b.” 
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Paragraph 3 
“If it is necessary for the proper execution of the police task, the distribution in 
accordance with articles 14 and 15 first paragraph under b, c, and d, from a severe crime 
database can be refused, or it can be carried out under restricting conditions with regard to 
further use.” 
 
[A] Restriction determination phase 
1) Communication goals 
In the Netherlands, on several occasions it appeared that police officers find 
great difficulty in the application of the PDA, which resulted in errors in the 
exchange of police data. The cause for this is found mainly in the unfamiliarity with 
and the complexity of the relevant legal provisions. The communication goal is to 
clarify the provisions cited, so that police officers can determine whether to distribute 
police data in actual cases. The communication in this example ought to be initiated 
by the public prosecution service. In the Netherlands, this is the institution that is 
responsible for the legality of the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. 
In that capacity, the office has authority over the police, and it also has to supervise 
the distribution of data from police databases. The goal of the communication for the 
public prosecution service is the establishment of distribution of police data in 
accordance with the PDA.  
2) Goals of the dissemination public  
In addition to the communication goal, we also have to establish the goals of the 
public addressed. The determination of these goals helps to define the domain, and it 
helps to determine the proper communication strategy. In our example, we restrict 
ourselves to police officers responsible for the management of SCD’s. The data in 
such registers mainly originate from informants. Such informants secretly provide 
information to the police about various criminal activities. Careless use of such 
information can have major consequences for the informants. Hence, the main goal 
of police officers that collect and register such information is to protect their sources 
(Koelewijn and Kielman 2006).  
3) Identifying attitudes  
The goal of identifying attitudes is closely related to the idea police officers have 
of the relevant legal sources. This attitude is the third lead in this model for imposing 
restrictions on the knowledge to be acquired. The attitude of the relevant police 
officers is to interpret the PDA in conformance with their main goal (the protection 
of their sources). In practice, this often leads to an incorrect interpretation of art. 13a 
par. 3 PDA. Police officers interpret this rule in such a manner, that the distribution 
of data from the SCD can be refused in all relevant cases. This interpretation will 
prove to be incorrect later on in the discussion of the model.  
4) Background knowledge 
Finally, in the last step of the restriction determination phase, we have to 
determine which knowledge with respect to the legal provisions is already present in 
the public concerned. As indicated before, research has shown that Dutch police 
officers have only limited knowledge of the provisions in the PDA [28]. 
Additionally, the two provisions selected make many references to other provisions 
in the PDA. Such references make the act hard to understand, and, therefore, they 
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have to be explained. Moreover, we saw that the two provisions also refer to 
‘categories of registered persons’ and the ‘police task’. These concepts hardly need 
any clarification for police officers. They generally have sufficient knowledge of the 
categories of persons on which they collect data, and of their specific police tasks.  
 
[B]  Expansion phase 
5) Making implicit information explicit 
Hierarchy. After the definition of the domain and the identification of 
information needs in the restriction phase, in the expansion phase, it is checked 
which information implicit to the legal provisions has to be made explicit. In case of 
legal provisions, implicit information often follows from the hierarchy between 
various regulations. Police officers need to realise that the distribution of police data 
from the SCD is governed by several regulations. The two provisions in the current 
example have a high abstraction level, which makes it hard for police officers to 
apply them in actual cases. In the references to other regulations, these norms contain 
a large quantity of implicit information, for instance in its references to lower 
regulations such as the Police Files Decree (hereafter: PFD). This decree provides 
much more detailed rules about distribution. These rules can be used in the 
translation. If we evaluate the distribution provisions in the decree, we find a list in 
art. 14 which provides a limitative enumeration of persons and institutions that are 
authorized to receive police data. Earlier research, however, showed that police 
officers do not know this particular decree, and hence they do not know the list in art. 
14. In the translation, it is thus necessary to make the list explicit.  
Exceptions. In addition, implicit information can be hidden in exception to 
provisions. In par. 2 of art. 13a PDA, there is a legal opportunity for refusing the 
distribution of police data from SCD’s. In the formulation of this provision, there is 
an implicit exception. According to legal doctrine, the phrase ‘distribution in 
accordance with art. 15 under b, c and d’ has to read in such a manner that the 
possibility of refusing distribution is not valid for the cases in which art. 15 under a 
and e are valid [3]. In those cases, the ground for refusal cannot be invoked.  
General rules following from case law. In our example, we have not found any 
relevant case law in which general rules are formulated with respect to the 
distribution of police data.  
6) Legal concepts 
Moreover, in the expansion phase, legal concepts have to be identified. Those 
are concepts that have a meaning different from their meaning in regular language 
use. We discuss two concepts that are used in the two distribution provisions: 
‘distribution’ and ‘necessity’.  
In art. 13a par. 2 PDA, the concept of distribution concerns an obligation to 
provide data. The police officer responsible for the management of the relevant SCD 
has, in principle, an obligation to respond to a lawful information request from, e.g., 
a different police officer. This obligation also means that the police officer providing 
the information only needs to check marginally if the requesting officer really needs 
the information [3]. By this, the legislator has tried to establish a free flow of 
information within parts of the police organisation.  
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The concept of ‘necessity’, used in art. 13a par. 3 PDA, refers to the demands of 
proportionality and subsidiarity. Proportionality means that the refusal has to be in a 
reasonable relation with the goal intended by that refusal. The protection of 
informants can be such a goal. Subsidiarity means that there ought not be a less 
drastic measure – if there is one, that measure should be taken. In the context of data 
distribution, this means that, for instance, the distributing officer should check 
whether there a restrictive condition could be laid upon the provision of data, such 
that the distribution need not be refused.  
Police officers will generally not be familiar with the underlying meaning of this 
concept of necessity, and therefore it needs to be clarified in the translation. Clearly, 
the legislator wished to express that refusing to distribute data is only allowed in 
exceptional cases, and that each new information request cannot be refused 
automatically. Instead, in each of those cases, the relevant interests have to be 
weighed against each other by the police officer.  
 
[C]  Strategy determination phase 
7) Dissemination modality 
In the third phase of the model, the communication strategy is determined. 
Determining such a strategy is the prerogative of communication specialists. They 
first have to determine the ‘tone of voice’ for the particular instance of 
communication. Directly relevant to determining the tone of voice are the 
communication goals identified for the ‘sender’ and the ‘receiver’ (the public) of the 
message. In our example, we saw that there is a hierarchical relation between the 
sender and the receiver, in which the former clearly has authority over the latter. The 
goals identified are also partly conflicting. The goal of the public prosecution office 
(the sender) is mainly aimed at compliance with legal norms, whereas the police 
officers in question (the receivers) mainly intend to protect their sources. Considering 
this conflict of interests, in this particular case, the public prosecution office probably 
should use an imperative tone of voice. This tone of voice could be established in the 
form of obligatory provisions with respect to the distribution of police data in case 
there is no ground for refusal. In case there is room for weighing interests, the public 
prosecution office can employ an ‘advisory’ tone of voice, for instance by 
formulating a number of assessment criteria.  
8) Communication type  
Furthermore, in determining the communication strategy, we have to consider 
the form in which the communication will take place. In the current example, the 
most obvious thing to do is to relate to communication methods that are already used 
in the domain. By doing this, there is a good chance that the communication goals 
will be attained. Two obvious means for communication are adding the instructions 
to an existing handbook for the police officials concerned, and to publish the 
instructions on the website of the public prosecution office. Such a handbook already 
exists, and the public prosecutions office could choose to add an extra chapter with 
clear instructions on how to deal with information requests for an SCD within the 
legal framework imposed by the PDA, supplemented by various practical examples. 
Using the public prosecution office’s website would imply an addition to the 
‘directives for investigation’ that are already published on that website. Using the 
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website would also mean that the police organisation would become more 
transparent and verifiable, as the public can directly access the instructions.  
[D] Translation phase 
9) Relevant rules  
Finally, in the fourth phase, the conversion of the legal provisions takes place, 
including all relevant background information, into clear instructions for police 
officers. First of all, we need to establish what restrictions are imposed in the 
‘restriction phase’, and what the information needs are. In our example, although 
police officers had some background knowledge about the subject, this background 
knowledge did not suffice to make proper decisions about actual information 
requests. The translation is aimed at clarifying knowledge implicit in the hierarchy of 
relevant regulations and legal concepts. In practice, this means that the list of 
authorized persons for the receipt of data from the PFD has to be provided, and that 
the information should clarify that art. 13a par. 2 of the PDA implies an obligation to 
distribute, that is only affected by the exception in par. 3. Furthermore, the 
exceptional nature of such a refusal should be stressed, in addition to the necessity of 
weighing arguments for and against compliance with each information request.  
10) Translation  
The output of the model is a possible translation of the two provisions and 
relevant background knowledge. It could take the following form:  
If, as a manager of a SCD, you receive a request for information about a certain 
person registered in your SCD, you have an obligation to provide that information in 
three cases: 
1) if the request is made by a public prosecutor; 
2) if the request is made by the BIBOB bureau (an integrity screening 
organisation); 
3) if the request is made by the AIVD or the RID (both are secret services).  
Please note that it is not permitted to refuse such requests, or to impose 
additional constraints on the provision of the information. 
If, as a manager of an SCD, you receive a request for information from one of 
the following persons:  
1) a detective or a different police officer; 
2) a civil servant working for the unusual transactions desk; 
3) a member of the royal military police;  
4) one of the other persons mentioned in art. 14 PFD; 
you have the obligation to consider the information request and to provide the 
data requested. In exceptional cases, the provision can be refused. In the decision to 
refuse the provision of certain data, the following criteria are applicable: 
1) Risks for the informant. To the degree that the use of the information constitutes 
a greater risk for the informant, you may be more careful with providing the 
requested information. In case the risk is life-threatening, the provision of data 
should probably be refused. 
2) Goal of the information request. Before refusing to respond to an information 
request, you have to take note of the goal of the information request. The interest 
behind the information request has to be weighed against the interest of 
protecting the informant. 
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Example: The fact that a suspect has a firearm always has to be provided to the 
team preparing his apprehension. The safety of that team outweighs the interests of 
the informant. 
3) Opportunities for restrictions. Before refusing to an information request, you 
have to determine whether additional constraints on the further use of the 
information supplied could still protect the informant to a sufficient degree. 
Example: Information can be provided with the explicit restriction that it may 
only be used for analysis ends. 
Finally, in case of doubt, you always need to consult the public prosecutor.  
 
This concludes the example concerning the regulation of the distribution of police data 
from the severe crime databases. In the following section, we elaborate on the framework of 
‘applied legal epistemology’. This framework uses the intrinsic value of the knowledge 
predicate in order to assess, e.g., statements of lawyers. In the current endeavour, regulating 
the collaboration between lawyers, citizens and communication experts requires taking into 
account different ‘types’ of knowledge, and differences in background knowledge. 
Furthermore, the normative nature of legal epistemology should be properly connected to the 
regulative nature of applying a reputation system to collaboration in legal knowledge 
dissemination.  
 
 
3. APPLIED LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
‘Applied legal epistemology’ denominates the research into practical applications of 
knowledge criteria. In the current transition of legal domains into the information and 
communications technology era, keeping a close watch of the proper guidance of epistemic 
preconditions is of vital importance. New technologies may improve epistemic opportunities 
(e.g. by providing prompt information access), but they may also have negative impact. For 
instance, the occurrence of so-called ‘virtual straitjackets’. Everyone has had their own 
experiences with forms lacking proper categories and voice response systems leading you 
through endless series of selections. I call these ‘virtual straitjackets’, and they are becoming 
ever more ubiquitous. A virtual straitjacket is a situation characterized by the following: 
 
a) The situation consists of ‘forcing’ individuals into options that do not offer the 
choice they prefer. 
b) The situation is based on previously made choices with respect to classification 
schemes. 
c) The situation is ‘virtual’, in the sense that the option offered is not a physical one. 
 
Although this sounds highly abstract, it can be made concrete very easily. For instance, 
handwritten notes will not be read if you put them on a computer-readable form, so that your 
comments about that form cannot be processed. And web forms may contain questions that 
do not allow you to provide a proper answer, by offering only a limited number of options 
and not providing an option ‘other, please specify’. Although they are not necessary for their 
occurrence, Information and communication technologies tend to trigger virtual straitjackets 
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because automating processes requires making explicit distinctions in order to avoid manual 
classification work. We are not conscious any more of many virtual straitjackets, simply 
because we are adjusted to particular classifications. But even the seemingly simple 
classification male/female may actually exclude people who do not have a clear gender.  
Virtual straitjackets occur more and more often in the legal domain. This is, assumedly, a 
consequence of the call for efficiency of legal aid and processing capacity. Automation is still 
often the answer to this efficiency call. Additionally, the use of information and 
communication technologies in law increases because they are used in normal activities such 
as word processing and information access. The most obvious example of a virtual straitjacket 
in law I came across was noted by Dory Reiling, a judge of the Amsterdam court. She was 
‘corrected’ by an employee who said: “Your Honor, you cannot impose that sanction, 
Compas [the administrative system for the Dutch public prosecutor – LM] cannot process it!” 
(Reiling 2006). This ‘Umwertung aller Werte’ is a fundamental threat to judicial 
independence and discretionary powers. Similarly, information systems that provide incorrect 
or incomplete information detrimental to the epistemic position of their users. 
The proper use collaborative environments requires the prevention of such virtual 
straitjackets, as they may hinder the development of knowledge, and thereby damage the very 
essence of collaboration in legal knowledge dissemination. In this section, we first discuss the 
value of the concept of knowledge – what does it mean? Is it a descriptive or normative 
concept? Subsequently, we discuss three dimensions of knowledge: its acquisition, object and 
justification. In subsection 2.3, we explain how these dimensions of knowledge fit into an 
abstract framework aimed at modelling legal domains. In subsection 2.4, finally, we discuss 
the epistemic roles, that play an important role in the application of the model to on-line 
collaboration. In the next section, this model will be used to develop ways of regulating on-
line collaboration for legal knowledge dissemination. 
 
 
3.1. The Value of Knowledge 
 
There are two basic grounds that support the assumption that the concept of knowledge as 
such is relevant. First, there is the utility of knowledge. Compared to mere belief, knowledge 
can be used as a reliable ground for decisions, behaviour and judgement. It may also serve as 
a means of gaining authority relative to those only having belief. In the legal domain, 
knowledge provides grounds for authoritative decisions. Rather than basing one’s decision on 
relatively unreliable beliefs, the basis for one’s inferences should be knowledge. Second, 
attaining knowledge is a goal that is worth aiming at as such, regardless of its utility. An 
argument with this content is put forward by Finnis (1980, p. 59-80). He claims that the 
pursuit of knowledge is a value, in the sense of a good: a goal that is worthwhile independent 
of any further utility in the achievement of survival, power, and popularity. The value of 
attaining knowledge is a principle of practical reasonableness, Finnis claims. It provides us 
with a direction in which we can lay out lines of argumentation. It can be used to generate 
new principles, and to direct the application of rules. In his discussion of the value of 
knowledge, he emphasises the importance of truth. Having knowledge presupposes truth, 
whereas beliefs can be true or false. Knowledge and truth are very close relatives, if we may 
regard the following quotation as representative of Finnis’ opinion on the matter (1980, p. 
61): 
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“In explaining, to oneself and others, what one is up to, one finds oneself able and ready to 
refer to finding out, knowledge, truth as sufficient explanations of the point of one’s activity, 
project, or commitment.” 
 
Finnis regards the value of knowledge as a self-evident principle. He asserts that self-
evidence of some principle has little or nothing to do with our feelings of certitude about that 
principle. Rather, he claims, the self-evidence of a principle shows itself in its employment as 
a criterion for the assessment of feelings. A principle such as the worthiness of knowledge 
can, on principle, not be proved. It can be adopted, though, on the assumption that its 
employment is fruitful, or rather, that, if it is not adopted, rational discourse becomes hard or 
impossible. In sum, knowledge is a better starting point for making inferences (the utility 
argument), and it is worthwhile in its own (the value argument).  
Knowledge, I claim, may be regarded as the mark of a quality stamp. It is a mark of 
approval; it says that a belief or a skill conforms to a set of criteria, and that it deserves to be 
called ‘knowledge’ for that reason. The applicable set of criteria depends on the type of entity 
that we wish to qualify as knowledge, and the context in which we encounter that entity. For 
instance, if we wish to qualify a belief about the actual selling of fake spare parts for 
automobiles as knowledge, we may demand that this belief is true. However, if we wish to 
qualify a belief about the breach of copyright in a particular case as knowledge, we may 
demand that this belief is justified rather than true, as the legal qualification of a fact is often a 
matter of providing a suitable argument. Representing knowledge thus requires us to make 
explicit the criteria by which the represented entities deserve their qualification as knowledge. 
These criteria may apply to the acquisition, object and justification of the entities. Thus, they 
do not only concern the content (object) of knowledge, but also the sources of knowledge 
(acquisition), and the reasons there are to believe its content (justification). Together, the 
criteria provide a framework for assessing whether to assign the quality mark. What is more, 
they provide valuable additional information on represented knowledge. 
The concept of knowledge takes an important place in representations of legal domains, 
because a large part of that domain consists of rules, norms, thoughts and skills the reflection 
of which, ideally, can be qualified as knowledge. As such, the value of knowledge is 
unchallenged. However, what knowledge in the legal domain amounts to, remains obscure on 
many occasions. The ‘ontology’ (a conceptual model of a domain) presented in this section is 
based on the necessity of expressing different views on the role of knowledge and the 
existence of entities in the legal domain. On a theoretical level, this enables us to avoid taking 
a stance in the legal-philosophical debate prior to building a model for an application.  
In this sense, the model developed may be called a ‘meta-ontology’ of law – it allows for 
different views on what knowledge in the legal domain actually amounts to. On a practical 
level, the model facilitates a detailed description of the context of knowledge items – how 
they are acquired, what they refer to, and how they are justified. To attain this, the model 
distinguishes between ontological status layers and epistemic roles. The ontological status 
layers enable the expression of different views on the existence of entities in the legal domain, 
and the epistemic roles enable expressing different views on what knowledge amounts to. In 
the context of building communities for legal knowledge dissemination, epistemic roles are of 
vital importance, as there should be a clear framework for the knowledge to be disseminated. 
Ontological status layers – denoting the ‘types of existence’ distinguished in philosophy of 
law – will receive little attention. These layers, such as validity and recognition, do not 
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directly play an important role in the current subject of research. Both epistemic roles and 
ontological status layers apply to ‘entities’, such as statements and questions. 
At the time of its origination, this framework itself did not cater for the need to 
distinguish between specialist knowledge and common knowledge. However, the current 
application of the framework, namely translating specialist legal knowledge into something 
suitable to become common knowledge, requires us to take into account the transition from 
the specialist nature of knowledge in the legal domain into the pursuit of disseminating it 
outside that particular domain. This inevitably has consequences for the outlines and 
application of the model. 
 
 
3.2. Three Dimensions of Knowledge 
 
To elaborate on the role that the concept of knowledge plays in the legal domain, I start 
from two relevant disciplines: ontology and epistemology. Ontology scrutinises the existence 
of (legal) entities, such as rules, norms, and legal institutions, and the dependencies between 
these entities. Epistemology regards the acquisition, object and justification of knowledge. 
Together, ontology and epistemology can provide an integrated view on the legal domain, 
thus facilitating the representation of knowledge. However, among those who practise legal 
epistemology and legal ontology, there is little consensus on what justifiable claims can be 
made within these disciplines. Moreover, prior to making such claims, one has to develop a 
general view on the law, and such attempts have been manifold (natural law theory, legal 
positivism etc.). A general view on the law inevitably comprises a view on the way in which 
the law can be known, and on the entities it consists of. Differences in the general views 
cause the lack of consensus on epistemological and ontological claims. 
The transition from belief to knowledge plays a major role in explaining the three 
dimensions of knowledge. By using criteria based on these dimensions, it is assessed whether 
a belief qualifies as knowledge. Only if it complies with all applicable criteria, a belief may 
be called knowledge. Therefore, the three dimensions of knowledge are discussed relative to 
beliefs. The first dimension is acquisition: how is the belief acquired? A person can acquire a 
belief by different routes, some of which deserve more trust than others. The second 
dimension is its object: what is the belief’s object? A person’s belief has – supposedly – some 
kind of object; the belief is about something. The third dimension is justification: how is the 
belief justified? A person can be justified in believing something. He can, for instance, have 
good reasons for his belief. Both acquisition and object belong to the so-called context of 
discovery. The justification of a belief constitutes the context of justification. The three 
dimensions are discussed below. 
 
Acquisition 
A belief can be acquired from different sources. On a sunny Sunday morning, John 
acquires the belief that the sun is shining by looking out of the window. He learns from the 
Saturday newspaper that it will start raining before 2 pm. His daughter tells him that she 
watched the morning weather forecast on the weather channel, and that she learned it will not 
start to rain until the evening. Perception (looking out of the window) and testimony (reading 
the newspaper and listening to your daughter) are called belief sources (Audi 1998). A belief 
source is the process or phenomenon that a belief is based upon. A knowledge source is 
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similar to that, except that in this case a piece of knowledge arises from the process or 
phenomenon. Audi (1998) distinguishes five sources of belief and knowledge: perception, 
memory, consciousness, reason, and testimony. 
Although legal knowledge may arise from the same sources as regular knowledge, the 
focus is somewhat different. I focus on specific sources of legal belief and knowledge, i.e., 
sources that are classified because of their content rather than by the acquisition method 
employed. These are the so-called knowledge sources for the law. In order to explain what 
knowledge sources for the law are, I start to elaborate on two different types of sources of 
law: formal and material sources of law. Subsequently, I explain what knowledge sources for 
the law are, and finally, I clarify to what extent sources of law (formal and material sources of 
law) can be qualified as knowledge sources for the law.  
There are two types of sources of law: formal sources of law and material sources of law. 
Formal sources of law are, according to Algra and Van Duyvendijk (1989, p. 19), the sources 
of positive law itself. These are statute law, treaties, and legal precedents (ibid.). Customary 
law is often also considered a formal source of law. Material sources of law are the 
origination sources of law, i.e., those factors that contributed to the drafting and interpretation 
of positive law. Material sources of law themselves cannot be reduced to legal rules or legal 
norms. They form, however, the grounds for those rules and norms. For instance, as soon as a 
judge has made a decision in a case, and he has based his decision partly on the consequences 
his decision will have for the social structure (socio-economical developments constitute a 
material source of law), he establishes a verdict (a legal precedent is a formal source of law).  
Algra and Van Duyvendijk (1989, p. 20) distinguish the following material sources of 
law: political powers, civil servants, pressure groups, religious beliefs, moral beliefs, socio-
economical developments, geographical circumstances, and technological developments. The 
importance of this enumeration is that material sources of law are indeed the external factors 
relevant to the origination and interpretation of the law. Material sources of law, such as 
moral beliefs and technological developments, have an impact on both the content of law and 
on the way in which the content of law is understood.  
Knowledge sources for the law are the sources through which we acquire knowledge 
about the law. Acquiring (explicit) knowledge about the law requires us to know two 
properties of the law: its content and its validity. Knowledge about the two properties is 
acquired in different manners for different legal-philosophical stances. In a legal-positivist 
stance, formal sources of law largely coincide with valid law. Thus, if one acquires 
knowledge of the formal sources of law, one will acquire knowledge of both the content and 
the validity of law. In a natural-law stance, however, this is not necessarily the case; the 
validity of law is also determined by principles that are not part of the system of positive law, 
and thus are not part of the formal sources of law. In such a stance, knowledge about the 
content of positive law is derived from the formal sources of law, but knowledge about the 
validity of positive law is partly derived from principles outside positive law.  
In legal-positivist and natural-law stances, knowledge about the content and validity of 
the law may also be derived from material sources of law. Material sources of law are helpful 
in interpreting the content of formal sources of law. Thus, sources of law (both formal sources 
of law and material sources of law) can function as knowledge sources for the law. However, 
their precise role may differ, depending on the legal-philosophical view of the law taken. 
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Object 
Beliefs are generally about something. They reflect some view on how things relate to 
each other in reality. For instance, beliefs are about the weather, a book, or a judgement. In 
that case, the weather, book, or judgement forms the object of the belief. Beliefs differ in how 
they relate to objects. They vary in their degree of abstractness (an abstract belief about an 
arbitrary conference paper versus a concrete belief about the copy of the paper you are 
currently holding), A belief is abstract when it generalises over individual objects; instead of 
referring to individual occurrences, it refers to object categories. A belief is concrete if it is 
connected with objects, i.e., if it refers to individual objects. 
The main difference between the object of legal knowledge and the object of regular 
knowledge, is that the object of legal knowledge largely consists of intangible institutions and 
entities, which brings about the danger of a confusion of the object of knowledge and the 
knowledge itself. I discern two categories within the object of knowledge about the legal 
domain. The first object category is legally-relevant, the second object category is legal. The 
objects within the first category are situations in the world that are relevant for the legal 
domain, i.e., entities, facts, acts, and practices that have not (yet) got assigned a legal status. 
The objects within the second category are situations in the world that are part of the legal 
domain, i.e., entities, facts, acts, and practices that have been assigned a legal status. A 
potential third category, namely non-legal, could well play a role in the current venture. A 
translation of legal knowledge could in certain circumstances involve circumstances, facts 
etcetera that are, while not being legally relevant, relevant to the communication venture. 
However, we will not further discuss this possibility. 
For instance, the object category of knowledge about the fact that John hit a pedestrian 
with his car is not legal. However, the object category becomes legal whenever the fact has 
the assigned legal status of criminal negligence. The fact that an object of knowledge is legal 
need not mean that the knowledge itself is legal. Neither does the fact that that an object of 
knowledge is legally-relevant imply that the piece of knowledge itself is legally-relevant. 
That depends on the content of the piece of knowledge itself. For instance, knowledge about 
hitting a pedestrian with a car as criminal negligence may count as a piece of legal knowledge 
if it concerns the legal consequences of that fact. 
The confusion of knowledge with the object of knowledge starts where the object of 
knowledge is more or less intangible: if it arises from reasoning or interpretation, or if it is an 
artifact resulting from social conventions. Whereas it is easy to distinguish the situation that 
John hits a pedestrian from the belief ‘John hits a pedestrian’, it is somewhat harder to 
distinguish an interpretation from a belief about that interpretation. The reason for this is that 
interpretations are not objects in the same way as we can regard, for instance, toys as objects: 
we cannot hold, feel, and look at interpretations from different angles (i.e., not literally), 
whereas in the case of toys, we can. We construct interpretations ourselves, and by doing this 
we ‘make’ knowledge – i.e., we do so according to some legal-philosophical viewpoints. In 
other viewpoints, the distinction will indeed not be made.  
 
Justification 
Justification amounts to those circumstances in which the content of some entity or 
behaviour is sufficiently defended. Such a defence can be given in an explicit way: in terms 
of reasons for the content of an entity, or a proof of the content of the entity. A defence can 
also be given in a rather implicit way, for instance by establishing a high chance that the 
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belief is true. Justification thus consists of all those factors that make us believe something. 
Justification is found in several forms. The typology I give in this subsection is partly based 
on Audi (1998, p. 2-3). I distinguish three main types of justification: justification as a state, 
justification as a process, and justification as a status. 
The first main type of justification is justification as a state. It refers to a situation in 
which an entity is justified, or in which a person is justified in believing something. Within 
this main type, there are four subtypes. (1) Belief justification is attained if certain criteria are 
met with respect to a specific belief. The belief is, in other words, in the state of being 
justified. (2) Personal justification occurs if a person is actually justified in having a belief, 
and he knows that he is in this state of justification. (3) Propositional justification occurs if 
there are sufficient reasons for justifying the proposition. If certain criteria are met with 
respect to a proposition, this proposition is in the state of being justified. (4) Situational 
justification occurs if a person has sufficient reasons to justify a certain belief, but 
nevertheless does not hold that belief. For instance, John has consulted the marriage register 
and read Mary’s name. However, he has not realised that this means that Mary is married. 
Thus, John would be justified in believing that Mary is married, but in fact, he does not 
believe that Mary is married. 
The second main type of justification is justification as a process. A state of justification 
can, but need not be, the result of a successful process of justification. Such a process may 
consist of exchanging reasons, or applying certain rules, or any series of acts that aims at 
accomplishing a state of justification. For instance, the different steps in a penal trial among 
others aim at reaching a clear picture of the actual facts. The rules that govern this process let 
the different parties present and explain their stances, and by presenting the evidence and 
responding to each other, ideally relevant and true statements are made as a conclusion.  
The third main type of justification is justification as the status of an entity. It refers to the 
justifying role an entity can play. For instance, a fact can be qualified as a reason, and then its 
justifying role is based on a status layer of the fact. In the example given above, the fact that 
Mary’s name is in the marriage register can be qualified as a reason for believing that Mary is 
married. Because it has the status of a reason, it performs a justifying role with respect to the 
belief that Mary is married. 
All three justification types are found in the legal domain. Some of the instances of the 
types are actually institutionalised in the law. An example of justification as a state is the 
legitimate character of evidence (which is attained by acquiring evidence in a lawful manner). 
An example of justification as a process is the application of parts of civil procedural law, 
which guide two parties in exchanging arguments. An example of justification as a status is 
the legitimising force a piece of evidence exerts towards a conclusion (e.g., evidence for 
finding a suspect guilty). From these examples, we can derive the main characteristic of 
justification with respect to legal belief. 
Basically, justification of legal belief is based on sources of law. In many cases, this 
means that it is rule-governed, i.e., procedural rules determine in what cases justification as a 
state, process or status occurs. The legitimate character of evidence arises from the lawful 
application of legal rules regarding the gathering of evidence. The legitimate character of a 
civil trial partly arises from following the applicable rules of procedure. The legitimising 
force a piece of evidence exerts towards a conclusion may also arise from legal rules 
regarding the role of evidence. Of course, this is only valid insofar as the legal system 
concerned is rule-based, such as the Dutch one is to a certain extent. 
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Table 1. An overview of the knowledge-based ontology of the legal domain 
 
type legally-relevant legal 
entities e.g. concepts e.g. legal rules 
ontological status layers e.g. recognition e.g. legal validity 
epistemic roles e.g. reasons e.g. factual legal knowledge 
relations e.g. counting as e.g. legal causation 
acts e.g. applying non-legal rules e.g. making legal decisions 
facts e.g. recognised facts e.g. conventional legal facts 
 
 
3.3. Basic Categories of the Knowledge-based Model of the Legal Domain 
 
An ontology specifies what elements and relations we can find in the legal domain. As a 
consequence of incorporating the concept of knowledge, the resulting ontology caters for the 
need to express relevant characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain. In Table 1, we 
give an overview of main types present in the knowledge-based model of the legal domain, 
complemented with an example of a subtype for each main type.  
 
Some words on the model’s main types ought to clarify the model. Entities are basic 
objects that are encountered in the legal domain. They may be assigned certain characteristics 
in the form of ontological status layers and epistemological roles. Ontological status layers 
are the existence characteristics of legally-relevant and legal entities, acts, and facts. 
Epistemic roles are claims regarding objects, signifying their function in acquiring or 
justifying knowledge. Relations express interdependencies among phenomena. A relation 
may state the consequences of some event, or impose new roles on existing objects. Acts 
indicate the operations of individuals and institutions in the legal domain. Facts involve 
objects, the characteristics of those objects, characteristics of characteristics, and relations 
between objects and between characteristics. They express the attributes of entities, 
individuals and institutions, or the relations between them. The core of the ontology is found 
in the ontological status layers and epistemic roles, as they represent the characteristics 
regarding the existence and knowledge status of entities. 
 
 
3.4. Epistemic Roles 
 
Ontological status layers and epistemic roles form the core of the model described in this 
article. As the ontology aims to accommodate different views on existence and knowledge in 
the legal domain, it has to provide for the means to represent these views. In this subsection, I 
discuss epistemic roles, as they play a major role in the practical application proposed in 
section 3. Epistemic roles are claims regarding objects. They have two functions. Either they 
signify the function an object has in granting the knowledge predicate to a different object, or 
they signify the knowledge predicate itself. The former function is fulfilled by the epistemic 
roles reason, defeater and conclusion, the latter by the roles factual knowledge and practical 
knowledge. If an object (e.g., a belief) has reason as its epistemic role, it supports the content 
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of a statement, i.e., the object functions as a means to make us believe the statement. 
Therefore, it helps to turn the statement into knowledge by contributing to its justification. 
Thus, the epistemic role of one item may help to establish a different epistemic role for 
another item. The following epistemic roles are distinguished: 
Reasons – Reasons are statements, propositions or facts that are employed for the 
explanation or justification of some other statement, proposition or fact (cf. Hage 1997). Each 
reason has a content (its meaning relative to its subject and object), a subject (a person, a 
group of persons or an authority, or there is no subject at all), an object (a belief, an action, a 
decision, a classification, an interpretation, or another reason), and a specific relation between 
subject and content (believe, constitute), and between content and object (explanatory, 
guiding). 
Defeaters – Defeaters are negative reasons, i.e., they attack some belief or reason in such 
a way that it is no longer correct. Defeaters that directly attack the conclusions of an argument 
are called ‘rebutting defeaters’. Defeaters that attack the relation between a reason and its 
conclusion are called ‘undercutting defeaters’. With an undercutting defeater, the assumption 
is challenged that some statement or fact is indeed a reason for a conclusion (Pollock 1999, p. 
196). Just as reasons, defeaters can be classified according to the distinctions made above. A 
defeater has a content, a subject, an object, and there is a specific relation between subject and 
content, and between content and object. The specification of a defeater in terms of these 
characteristics is thus comparable to the specification of a reason.  
Conclusions – Conclusions are inferences from existing statements, reasons and 
defeaters. These include not only the ‘classical’ logical inferences such as deductions, but 
also the more sophisticated non-logical inferences, related to e.g. Toulmin’s argumentation 
scheme. Any statement that gets the epistemic role of being a conclusion, can also acquire 
other epistemic roles. One conclusion can, for instance, be a reason for a different conclusion. 
Factual knowledge – The epistemic role ‘factual knowledge’ is granted to an entity if that 
entity complies with certain so-called knowledge criteria. Suitable entities are beliefs, 
statements and propositions. Knowledge criteria regard the acquisition, object and 
justification of knowledge. Reliability of acquisition, the truth relation between knowledge 
and its object, the coherence of a system of beliefs, and the justification of the content of 
knowledge together support the granting of the knowledge predicate. Factual knowledge 
concerns those parts of knowledge whose content can be expressed in a natural language.  
Practical knowledge – The epistemic role ‘practical knowledge’ is granted to those 
entities that comply with certain demands. Unlike factual knowledge, practical knowledge 
does not apply to well-described entities. Instead, it applies to certain skills and competences, 
for instance to the assessment capabilities of a judge, or the pleading skills of a lawyer. 
Criteria for the assessment of such knowledge are somewhat harder to determine, as the 
acquisition, object and justification dimensions are unclear. Rather than an existing object, 
against which knowledge can be tested, practical knowledge often produces new objects. The 
acquisition dimension thus becomes a production dimension, which can still rely on the 
reliability criterion. This applies especially to the legal domain, in which the ability to defend 
or assess a case, or to make a judgement, heavily depends on the experience of a legal 
professional. 
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3.5. Knowledge Criteria 
 
Under what conditions may we call something legal knowledge? This question has been 
revived by Gettier (1963), who explained that the definition of knowledge as true justified 
belief needed revision. Knowledge criteria define conditions under which we can qualify an 
entity as knowledge. We discuss four criteria that may establish a qualification relation 
between a belief and a ‘piece’ of knowledge. These criteria are truth, justification, reliability, 
and coherence. They criteria regard the correspondence of a belief with a part of reality, the 
presence of satisfactory reasons for the belief, the reliability of the acquisition of a belief, and 
the conformity of an individual belief with other, related beliefs, respectively. Except for 
truth, the knowledge criteria add to the fulfilment of the broad concept of justification, i.e., if 
the criteria proper justification, reliability and coherence are fulfilled, this provides support 
for the conclusion that the broad concept of justification is fulfilled as well. The use of 
knowledge criteria for the evaluation of legal beliefs was discussed in, e.g., Mommers (1999) 
and Mommers and Van den Herik (2000).  
 
Truth 
‘Truth’ and ‘true’, as expressions of our daily language, refer to different phenomena. For 
instance, if we say that we want to know the truth about the Bijlmer disaster, we mean that we 
want an accurate and complete description of the plane crash, of its causes, and of the events 
that followed it. If we assert that Van Thijn acted as a true leader after the disaster, we mean 
that he did what we think a leader should do under certain circumstances. In case we state that 
what Van Thijn said was true, we mean that he made a statement that corresponded to an 
actual event – provided that we regard truth as a semantic, non-epistemic criterion. Semantic 
means that truth is a relation between sentences and reality. Non-epistemic means that truth 
does not depend on knowledge; if we are absolutely convinced that some proposition is true, 
that does not mean it is true. Instead, truth depends on the actual agreement between a 
proposition and reality.  
If, however, we regard truth as an epistemic criterion, truth becomes a function of the 
presence of some form of justification for a belief. The truth of a belief then depends, for 
instance, on the presence of good reasons for that belief. As a consequence of identifying 
truth with some epistemic criterion, it easily becomes empty. So, for instance, when we 
identify truth with providing sufficient reasons, we may as well drop the notion of truth. But 
if we make the truth of a belief dependent on the fulfilment of several different epistemic 
criteria, for instance proper justification and coherence, truth can be a useful predicate.  
Truth, understood as a non-epistemic criterion, is independent of our knowledge. It 
belongs to the realm of semantics. The non-epistemic versions of semantics describe the 
meaning of language in terms of the relation between language and reality. This means that 
the truth of a belief does not depend on the belief’s relation with other beliefs. Instead, it only 
depends on the belief’s relation with reality. The main non-epistemic truth criterion is 
correspondence truth. This criterion says that for a sentence to be true, it should be in 
accordance with a situation in reality. Thus, the truth of some sentence does not depend on 
our opinion about its truth. The truth of a sentence can be postulated, but it can only be 
backed by giving reasons or proof for it, and never be proved unconditionally.  
Such an idealised, semantic notion of truth has a major disadvantage. If we succeed in 
separating epistemic considerations from semantic ones, i.e., if we separate the relation 
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between knowledge and reality from the relation between language and reality, our 
epistemology should preferably be such that it enables us to form correct beliefs about reality. 
Otherwise we would never be able to apply the concept of truth in real situations, i.e., we 
would never be able to say (with an acceptable degree of certainty) whether some statement is 
true or false. Therefore, we have to find some way of linking our epistemic evidence (in the 
form of reasons and a reliability measure) to a state-of-affairs as it is in the objective world. A 
realist epistemology enables us to do so. In a realist epistemology we may hold the 
assumption that we form true beliefs whenever they are sufficiently justified.  
In the context of this article, we adapt a simplified version of Devitt’s (1991) notion of 
correspondence truth to accommodate human-constructed facts (for instance the existence of 
a legal rule ‘killing a person on purpose counts as manslaughter’) in the following way:  
 
A sentence is true or false in virtue of: (a) its structure; (b) the referential relations between its 
parts and reality; (c) the objective nature of that reality.  
 
In this definition, only part (c) is altered. In the original definition Devitt (ibid.) refers to 
the ‘objective and mind-independent nature of that reality’. The mind-independence demand 
is left out because it restricts the application area of the correspondence truth criterion too 
much. To be able to apply the non-epistemic correspondence truth criterion we just need to 
guarantee that the parts of reality we are talking about are not true (or false) because we say 
they are true (or false), but because they have been established already when we state 
something about them. For instance, the establishment of such facts can be attained by 
institutional rules or by conventions.  
 
Justification 
Beliefs are justified in different ways, depending on their content and on their type. A 
belief can be justified by other beliefs, such as beliefs based on sensory evidence, beliefs 
based on the statement of another person, or by facts. The fact that the streets are dry could 
form a reason for me to believe that is has not rained. In as far as the justification of a belief 
(or some other entity, such as an act or a proposition) is given in terms of explicit reasons, we 
call it justification. Justification refers both to the act of giving reasons and to the state of 
being justified. If I give some reason for my belief, I am in the process of justifying properly, 
and if I have sufficient reasons for my belief, the state of being justified properly is attained. 
A belief can be justified for one person while it is not for another. For instance, if I lack 
reasons for a belief, but a friend of mine has good reasons for a belief with the same content, 
he will be justified properly in his belief, whereas I will not be justified properly in my belief.  
Justification is central to knowledge about the legal domain, as such knowledge is often 
about entities that derive their existence from reasoning. Reasoning comprises the 
arrangement or reasons in such a form that a consistent argument structure results, and 
ideally, the proper justification criterion is fulfilled. In the description of proper justification 
in the legal domain, the focus is somewhat different from proper justification for regular 
knowledge. In traditional epistemology, proper justification is discussed mainly with respect 
to perceptual beliefs. Justification in the legal domain also applies to other types of beliefs, 
such as interpretative beliefs. For instance, if we need to interpret some law text, different 
sources of justification enter. Reasons in such a context may be based on material and formal 
sources of law.  
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Defining proper justification in a realistic way, that is, employing a criterion that can 
actually be used in real life, can be attained. The following example definition of proper 
justification takes into account both reasons and defeaters: there should be either a conclusive 
or a non-conclusive reason for a subject to believe a certain proposition p. Additionally, there 
should not be a defeater for this proposition, nor for the reason for the subject to believe that 
proposition.  
In this definition, some arbitrary choices are made with respect to the depth of 
justification. For instance, in some cases, one non-conclusive reason is hardly sufficient 
justificatory material to justify a certain belief. And if there are reasons that are inconsistent 
with each other, how do we choose the right one? However, justifying a conclusion by giving 
a reason for it, and justifying these reasons by giving other reasons, and so ad infinitum, does 
not fit in with our needs either. Therefore, a relatively arbitrary choice with respect to the 
depth of justification is necessary to apply the criterion in a sensible manner.  
 
Reliability 
The criterion of reliability mainly applies to perceptual beliefs (cf. section 2.5). The issue 
that induced the introduction of the reliability criterion is illustrated by the following 
example, drawn from Goldman (1976, p. 772-773), and paraphrased in Audi (1993, p. 188). 
A person named Henry enters a district where, along the roads, barns made out of papier-
mâché appear. However, Henry cannot see the difference between real barns and fake ones. 
At the border of the district, he sees a barn, which is a real one. Now, Henry’s belief that he 
sees a barn is true and it is justified, but is it knowledge? Goldman says we are inclined to say 
it is not. The criterion that should be complied with is the reliability of a belief, which is 
defined by Goldman as follows. Given a certain belief, there should be no (potential) event 
that could cause the same belief, while that belief, which is justified and true, is not a piece of 
knowledge. Thus, in case of Henry, there should be no papier-mâché barn on the route. If 
there is one, Henry could form a belief about a real barn on the same route (‘there is a barn 
right here’). He could be justified in believing it, and the belief would be true. But the belief 
would not be knowledge, because of the possible occurrence of an event that would prevent 
the belief from being transformed into knowledge. This criterion of reliability primarily 
concerns perceptual beliefs.  
Audi lists a number of subcriteria that determine whether a perceptual belief complies 
with the reliability criterion (Audi 1993, p. 17):  
 
“1  the acuteness of the senses relevant to forming, sustaining, and confirming the belief; 
2  the normality of their operation at the time; 
3  the appropriateness of the perceptual circumstances to the content of the belief; 
4  the normality of the perceiver’s responses to the sense(s); 
5  the absence of a justified belief - or of justification for believing - that one or more of 
(1)-(4) fails to hold.”  
 
In brief, these criteria amount to the following. Criterion (1) says that we should have the 
power to discriminate a certain fact. So if I claim that I see a barn, I should be in close 
distance to it. In that case I can discriminate it clearly from its surroundings, and do not 
mistake it with some other object (a barn facsimile). Criterion (2) says that our senses should 
operate properly. Hallucinations and optical illusions can disturb what we perceive. Criterion 
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(3) says that our perception should be appropriate to the kind of belief it is supposed to 
sustain. This means that when we perceive a colour, the lighting should enable us to 
distinguish red from green. Criterion (4) says that a disturbance between the act of perceiving 
and the forming of a belief should not occur. While we see a red thing, we may not belief it is 
red, just because we are confused in some way. Criterion (5) says that there should be no 
reason for us to believe that any of these problems occurs at the time (ibid., p. 201-202).  
Reliability of legal beliefs should allow for the assessment of beliefs concerning legal 
affairs. But reliability has traditionally been applied to perceptual beliefs. These beliefs 
constitute only a small part of the beliefs relevant for the legal domain. Reliability is a 
measure for the integrity of the cognitive system. It is an externalist criterion, i.e., it provides 
us with the chance that our cognitive system yields correct beliefs, and this measure is 
determined independently of our internal states. Audi’s (1993, p. 17) five criteria for 
determining the reliability of a belief all hold for perceptual and testimonial beliefs in the 
legal domain as well. For the other types of belief, the reliability criterion has to be rephrased. 
In case of a memorial belief (cf. section 2.5) that is originally based upon perception, both the 
reliability of the perceptual apparatus and the reliability of the memory of a person are 
relevant. In case of a reasoned belief (cf. section 2.5), there should be an acceptable reasoning 
method, and in case of interpretative beliefs (idem), the way the belief is acquired should be 
acceptable as well. Therefore, we define reliability in the legal domain as follows:  
 
A legal belief is acquired in a reliable manner whenever the route by which it is acquired is 
acceptable by the standards in a given legal and social context.  
 
Reliability is thus based upon the acceptability of the route by which a belief is acquired. 
In case of perceptual beliefs, reliability is measured in terms of the production of truth. In 
case of reasoned beliefs, the truth criterion may have to be dropped. Instead, the adherence to 
a procedure becomes important for the fulfilment of the reliability criterion. If there is no 
fixed procedure for the acquisition of a belief, such as with interpretative beliefs, the 
acceptability of its acquisition can be determined entirely by relating to the content of the 
interpretative belief. To establish the acceptability of the acquisition route of interpretative 
beliefs, we refer to the reasons given for these beliefs. Reliability is then reduced to the 
fulfilment of the proper justification criterion for a sufficient amount of interpretative beliefs 
produced by a certain person.  
The difference between the reliability criterion and the justification criterion is that the 
former is located in the ‘context of discovery’, and the latter in the ‘context of justification’. 
The former is about the production of beliefs, and the adherence to the procedures that 
perform this task, the latter is about providing good reasons for the result of the procedure. 
Distinguishing the two is difficult, because the adherence to a procedure also adds to the 
proper justification of a belief.  
 
Coherence 
In the current subsection, we start discussing general definitions of coherence. The main 
similarity between the two definitions we give (their internalist nature) is the outset of a brief 
discussion of the degree to which coherence constitutes truth. After that, we discuss legal 
philosophers’ views on coherence, explaining the main components of their definitions. There 
are different definitions of coherence, varying from the logical definition by Kirkham (1992) 
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to the extensive definition that was derived from BonJour’s (1985) The Structure of Empirical 
Knowledge. Kirkham’s definition of coherence says that a coherent belief set should be 
consistent, and that there should be inductive or deductive implication relations among the 
beliefs (cf. Kirkham 1992, p. 104):  
 
“Each member of some set of statements or beliefs is consistent with any subset of the other 
statements or beliefs. Each statement or belief is inductively or deductively implied by the set 
of premises formed by all other statements or beliefs, or by each other statement or belief.”  
 
Bender (1989) gives a summary of the subcriteria of the coherence criterion he found in 
BonJour’s (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. The following set of conditions 
must be fulfilled in order for a set of beliefs to be coherent (Bender 1989, p. 5):  
 
“(i)  It is logically consistent, 
(ii)  It has a high degree of probabilistic consistency, 
(iii) It has a significant number of relatively strong inferential connections among 
component beliefs, 
(iv)  It is relatively unified, i.e., does not divide into relatively unconnected subsystems, 
(v)  It contains few unexplained anomalies, 
(vi)  It provides a relatively stable conception of the world and remains coherent (i.e. it 
satisfies (i)-(v) in the long run) and 
(vii)  It satisfies the Observation Requirement, i.e., it must contain laws attributing a high 
degree of reliability to a reasonable variety of cognitively spontaneous beliefs, 
including introspective beliefs.”  
 
When comparing Kirkham’s (1992) and BonJour’s (1985) coherence criterion, the 
striking difference is that Kirkham’s criterion refers only to logical characteristics of the 
belief set, whereas BonJour’s criterion also refers to the content of those beliefs, the degree to 
which the beliefs in the set are unified, the stability of the belief set, and the link between 
beliefs and the world (the Observation Requirement). However, in both definitions, coherence 
is still an internalist criterion, i.e., it concerns the internal relations of some system. It does 
not concern the relations between the system and reality, unless there are beliefs in the system 
that concern reality (and then the Observation Requirement comes into play).  
The internalist nature of the coherence criterion has a consequence for the relation 
between coherence and truth. The degree of coherence is often regarded as a direct measure 
for the degree of truth of the beliefs to which it applies. I reject this interpretation, because 
beliefs can be coherent without being about reality. But even if coherence is not used as a 
truth criterion itself, it can be used as a knowledge criterion in either of two ways. First, its 
purpose can be to give epistemic support for the truth of the beliefs involved (instead of being 
a direct measure for the truth of the beliefs, it gives support for the assumption that the beliefs 
involved are true by correspondence). This is attained by employing the assumption that 
beliefs cohere because they adequately represent a coherent reality. Second, its purpose can 
be to support the beliefs by the mere fact that they cohere. In this case, coherence directly 
supports the transition of belief to knowledge; it is an ideal in itself.  
Coherence in law is defined in very different ways, but with very much the same 
intentions. MacCormick (1978, p. 152) says about coherence that “the multitudinous rules of 
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a developed legal system should ‘make sense’ when taken together”. The criterion usually 
consists of a demand of consistency plus a demand of the presence of reasonable content 
relations among beliefs. Thus, two beliefs cohere with each other when they do not logically 
exclude each other and we are able to say that they fit in with each other.  
Peczenik (1989, p. 178-179) distinguishes between thirteen subcriteria constituting the 
notion of coherence. I summarise these subcriteria by three measures, viz. support, preference, 
and universality. The first measure, support, relates to the degree to which some statement is 
backed by reasons, and the degree to which it is interconnected with other (universal) 
statements, and the degree to which a set of statements contains supported statements, etc. 
The second measure, preference, indicates the degree to which principles relate to each other 
in a preferential order. The third measure, universality, denotes the degree to which concepts 
can be applied generally, resemble each other, are cross-connected, etc. According to 
Peczenik, the list applies to statements, universal statements, concepts, theories, reasons, 
chains of reasons, and principles. But for the sake of simplicity, we assume that they apply to 
beliefs as well.  
There is an important argument in support of employing coherence as a knowledge 
criterion. The legal domain is a part of reality constructed by human beings. If we try to 
theorise about that part of reality, it could be argued that coherence is a reasonable criterion to 
employ. Human beings usually try to apply as much consistency on the things they design as 
possible. The quality of some work (be it a law or a book) is often judged by coherence-type 
criteria. Therefore, coherence becomes a reasonable demand.  
Summarising, coherence concerns the presence and nature of relations in a set of beliefs: 
its main ingredient is the support measure mentioned above. Except for the demand of 
consistency of the beliefs considered, content relation among those beliefs play a central role 
in the concept of coherence. We therefore define the criterion as follows:  
 
A set of legal beliefs is coherent whenever there is a high number of support relations among 
the beliefs in the set. 
 
In section 4, the four knowledge criteria discussed above are used to define practical 
requirements and assessment schemes for collaborative environments. 
 
 
4. IMPROVING THE QUALITY 
 OF CONTRIBUTIONS IN COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTS 
 
There are methods of improving the quality of production in collaborative workspaces. 
These are based on the improvement of (perceived) authoritativeness in on-line environments. 
An example of a schema meant for assessment in on-line legal collaborative workspaces is 
provided in Mommers 2003. The schema proposed is based on assessment frameworks that 
are in use in other contexts, such as IT forums, online auctions and review sites, and on 
fundamental research on valuation of knowledge. It uses truth, reliability, coherence and 
justification as main criteria for valuing contributions and contributors, in an attempt to 
assess, and if possible promote, their individual quality.  
Communities for Legal Knowledge Dissemination 
 
141 
The same quality improvement can be attained by making use of human moderators. 
Their contribution, however, is more expensive - and it may be more intrusive to individual 
collaborators - than moderation regulated by a reputation management system. Also, the 
combination of human moderators with a reputation system may be considered. A reputation 
management system should take into account the specific requirements of professional legal 
environments. This means not only that the information built and moulded in a collaboratory 
should acquire sufficient authority, quality and reliability, but also that it respects professional 
autonomy, and is accepted and actively supported by management. In practice, this means 
that it should somehow acquire the status usually ascribed to, for instance, publishing articles 
in professional journals.  
If we take a closer look at the development of collaboratories, we can see a need for 
mechanisms to value individual contributions and contributors. The attitude of contributors 
and users towards a contribution may be expressed in valuations and justifications of those 
valuations. These valuations may be backed by profiling information on a contributor, 
establishing a reliability profile for that member. This profile can be used by others to 
determine whether they are inclined to believe and use the contribution. Benkler (2006, p. 
104) states that “Cooperation in peer-production processes is usually maintained by some 
combination of technical architecture, social norms, legal rules, and a technically backed 
hierarchy that is validated by social norms.”  
In a legal context, much work may well benefit from the interaction among different 
practitioners. The combination of collaboratories with elements of knowledge-valuing 
techniques may form a fruitful environment for knowledge development and enhancement. 
Despite these benefits of a ‘collaboratory reputation system’, measures must be taken to avoid 
contributors creating many pseudonyms and use them to gain a disproportionately large 
influence.  
 
 
4.1. Collaboratories and the Three Dimensions of Knowledge 
 
With respect to three dimensions of knowledge, namely knowledge acquisition, the 
object of knowledge, and justification of knowledge, a reputation system for collaboratories 
can take the following form. The acquisition dimension may, for instance, require 
contributors to a legal collaboratory to indicate how they have acquired the information they 
use in their arguments (the origination source of the information), so that other users and 
contributors can establish the reliability of that information. The object dimension may, for 
instance, require a clear indication of the content source of the information, enabling other 
contributors to check such sources and to assign value to them. The justification dimension 
requires contributors to argue their positions and their comments on other contributions.  
The justification dimension has been subject of extensive research (e.g. Gordon 1995, 
Hage 1997, Prakken 1997, Verheij 1996). A collaboratory environment offers the opportunity 
to use meta-information on the acquisition, object and justification of knowledge to direct the 
interaction between contributors towards a satisfactory result. Implementing criteria relating 
to the three dimensions of knowledge thus enables the support of procedural and substantive 
justification, while taking into account both the truth, reliability and coherence of the 
knowledge content of a system. As such, knowledge criteria, related to the three dimensions 
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of knowledge, may act as a guidance in the exchange of ideas about a certain legal issue, and 
form the main reference points for assigning value to those ideas.  
The outline of the proposed reputation system is as follows. The entities distinguished are 
discussions, contributors, statements, and questions. Epistemic roles distinguished are 
reasons, defeaters, conclusions and factual knowledge.  
Table 2 indicates the way in which the value for a knowledge criterion with respect to an 
element (entity or epistemic role) is determined. Note that the valuations can differ per 
assigned epistemic role. For instance, a statement that counts as a reason (has ‘reason’ as an 
epistemic role) can have a justification value different from the same statement that counts as 
a defeater (has ‘defeater’ as an epistemic role). The statement itself can also have a different 
justification value. 
With respect to the reliability and justification criteria, elements are assigned a value 
between 0 and 1. With respect to the truth and coherence criteria, one of three values is 
assigned: for truth, the values are true, false and not applicable, and for coherence, the values 
are coherent, incoherent and not applicable. A brief explanation of the ways in which the 
values are determined follows below.  
The reliability of an element (except for contributors) is determined directly on the basis 
of the reliability value for the contributor who introduced the element. Reliability is measured 
as a value between 0 and 1. The initial reliability of a new contributor can be set by the other 
contributors. Contributors can earn a higher (or lower) score by the evaluation of their 
contributions by other contributors. The reliability of a contributor is calculated from (1) the 
number of positive and negative valuations and (2) the relevance of the elements for which 
the valuations are determined.  
The value true or false can be assigned to an element (a reason, defeater or conclusion) 
by individual contributors under two conditions. These conditions are: the truth or falsity of 
an element ought not be disputed by a different contributor with a certain minimum reliability 
score, and the reliability of the element itself ought to have a certain minimum value. Of 
course, the assignment of the value true to an element only establishes the assumption that the 
element is true. If the assignment of the value is not disputed, this adds to the reliability of the 
contributor.  
The value coherent or incoherent can be assigned to an element by individual 
contributors under two conditions. These conditions are: the postulated coherence or 
incoherence of an element ought not be disputed by more contributors than it is supported by, 
and there ought to be a minimum value for the justification status of the element. If the 
assignment of the value is not disputed, this adds to the reliability of the contributor.  
The value for the justification criterion is either an initial value, equal to the reliability 
value for the contributor who contributed it, or a derived value, based on the presence of 
reasons or defeaters for a conclusion. In both cases, the value can be adjusted by contributors. 
In the latter case, the system calculates a justification value on the basis of justification values 
of reasons and defeaters pointing to the element at hand. In addition, the value of individual 
elements, and the justifying or rebutting force an element exerts towards a different element, 
can be valued by contributors by increasing or decreasing the assigned value.  
 
 
 
 
Communities for Legal Knowledge Dissemination 
 
143 
Table 2. Valuations for entities and epistemic roles within a collaboratory environment 
 
criteria reliability truth coherence justification 
entities 
discussion equals the average 
valuation of all 
contributors’ 
reliability 
not applicable valuation of 
coherence across 
all contributions 
(statements and 
questions) 
not applicable 
contributor equals the average 
valuation of a 
person’s 
contributions 
not applicable valuation of 
coherence across 
contributions  
valuation of being 
justified in taking a 
stance 
statement equals the average 
reliability of the 
contributor 
assigned by 
contributor 
valuation of 
coherence between 
the elements of the 
statement 
valuation of 
justification status 
 
question not applicable not applicable valuation of 
coherence between 
the question and a 
discussion 
not applicable 
epistemic roles 
reason equals reliability 
of the contributor 
who introduced 
the element 
assigned by 
contributor 
not applicable valuation of 
justifying force 
with respect to a 
conclusion 
defeater equals reliability 
of the contributor 
who introduced 
the element 
assigned by 
contributor 
not applicable valuation of 
rebutting force with 
respect to a 
conclusion 
conclusion equals reliability 
of the contributor 
who introduced 
the element 
assigned by 
contributor if no 
defeaters present 
not applicable valuation of 
justification status 
 
factual 
knowledge 
maximum 
reliability 
true coherent justified 
 
An example of a calculation for a justification value is as follows. There are two reasons 
and one defeater for a conclusion. Reasons p and r have justification values with respect to a 
conclusion of respectively 0.8 and 0.7, defeater q has a ‘negative’ justification (rebutting) 
value of 0.3 towards the same conclusion. The initial justification value for the conclusion is 
calculated by a simple division of (0.8 + 0.7 – 0.3) by 3 is 0.4. Because the combination of 
reasons does not necessarily lead to a higher degree of justification, this is only an indicative 
value. Justification values can be adjusted by individual contributors, but only to a certain 
degree, depending on their reliability value. The higher a contributor’s reliability, the more he 
or she can influence the justification value of an item.  
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On the basis of the valuation of different criteria with respect to a given element, the 
knowledge predicate can be assigned to those elements that comply with a certain fixed set of 
criteria, for instance a sufficient degree of reliability and justification. The knowledge 
predicate functions as a simple identifier for those elements that form the consolidated core of 
content of a collaboratory environment.  
The work on a particular subject is enabled by a number of possible moves: contributors 
can introduce statements and questions, and attach different epistemic roles (reasons, 
defeaters, conclusions and factual knowledge) to them, they can comment on any of these, 
they can value an element (entity or epistemic role), and they can revoke an element. The 
value and predicate assignment guidelines described above constitute only a rough idea of an 
actual collaboratory, as such an environment should include a rule set that provides a stable 
discussion environment, in which new contributors and contributors with dissenting opinions 
still have a say.  
 
 
5. ON-LINE COLLABORATION 
 IN LEGAL KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION 
 
Summarizing, the argument made in this article is as follows. Understanding of the law 
by the citizens of a state is crucial for the legitimacy of governance. For citizens to understand 
the law, there has to be a translation of sources of law into understandable information, taking 
into account factors such as the background knowledge and goals of the information public. 
In order to perform this translation activity, legal professionals and communication 
professionals have to work together. Their collaboration has to be guided to improve the 
quality of their contributions and of the dissemination product. This involves facilitating 
interdisciplinary communication, and the ‘interfacing’ between the knowledge comprised by 
these disciplines, and their vocabularies.  
To support this interfacing task, the concept of knowledge is analyzed according to three 
dimensions, namely acquisition, object, and justification. Each of these dimensions leads to 
the establishment of  knowledge criteria, normative criteria establishing the difference 
between mere belief and knowledge (cf. section 3.5). If a belief satisfies the criteria, it gains 
the qualification as knowledge as a kind of ‘quality stamp’. The criteria themselves (truth, 
reliability, coherence and justification) provide ample opportunity for establishing functional 
requirements regarding an online collaborative environment. In establishing these 
requirements, the goal of collaboration in legal knowledge dissemination should, of course, 
be leading.  
Four types of entities and four epistemic roles (only practical knowledge is left out) 
discussed above are used in the context of the current framework. They are listed in the table 
below. For each of the entities and epistemic roles, there is an indication of how the value of 
the knowledge criteria reliability, truth, coherence and justification is determined. Valuations 
are either determined manually, or calculated on the basis of a collection of manual 
valuations. Although reliability and truth should not attain an intersubjective nature by way of 
these valuations, in practice there is no other attainable way of establishing the compliance 
with these criteria.  
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5.1. Regulating Collaboration 
 
Returning to the example from the previous section, the translation given there is actually 
the outcome of extensive research not only in legal doctrine, but also in the practice of police 
data exchange. The explaining of such a brief fragment of a regulation therefore shows how 
important it is to collaborate closely on these matters: how to articulate relevant questions on 
the one hand and answers to these questions on the other hand. It also proves the sheer scale 
of the ambition of letting people collaborate on-line on such complex matters, and even to try 
to ‘regulate’ this collaboration.  
Moreover, the regulation should be – at least partly – in the hands of the collaborators. 
This is an interesting idea put forward in collaborative workspace literature (Groenouwe and 
Top 2006), namely that of letting establish the rules of a particular collaborative exercise to 
be determined by the participants in that exercise. Instead, however, of employing a rather 
formal-logical approach to this so-called ‘constitution’ (the basic rules of collaboration and 
use), we choose to focus on easily-usable rule frameworks and compliance-furthering 
mechanisms. It thereby not only relates to the hereforementioned collaborative workspace 
research, but also to the work of those who claim that the web itself encompasses numerous 
regulative mechanisms (Lessig 1999).  
We wish to stress the importance of preventing ‘virtual straitjackets’ from occurring, both 
in the collaborative processes themselves, and in regulative systems governing those 
processes (which, of course, are closely connected to each other). Measures that may 
guarantee this, might range from a non-invasive reputation system (it does not limit the rights 
of a contributor in any way, it just indicates contributors’ and contributions’ reputation 
values) to ‘rule of law’ ways of governing the reputation system’s behaviour (e.g. the rules of 
the reputation system should comply with some minimum requirements (cf. Fuller 1969). 
This is why we propose a layered model for the reputation system. 
Rather than using a ‘constitution’, usage rules and compliance mechanisms are deemed to 
be a collection of the following elements: (a) a ‘Collaboration Mission’, setting out the 
collective goal of the community, and the goals of the individual (groups of) participants; (b) 
a ‘Code of Conduct’, setting out the principles of collaboration in terms of what to do and 
what not to do; (c) a ‘Reputation Charter’, establishing how the valuing of individual 
contributions and individual participants should take place; and (d) a ‘Reputation System’, 
implementing the policies from the reputation charter into the collaborative workspace. The 
resulting framework forms, together with the actual collaborative workspace, an experimental 
setting, of which this article only sets out the initial situation.  
Fuller’s (1969) minimum criteria for a functioning legal system are: (1) its rules must be 
general in nature; (2) its rules must be publicly promulgated; (3) its rules must be effective 
only from the time of promulgation; (4) its rules should be understandable; (5) the rules 
should be consistent with each other; (6) the legislator and citizens ought to be able to follow 
the rules; (7) its rules should be relatively stable; (8) administration should be consistent with 
its rules. If we apply these criteria to the regulation of a collaborative environment, namely to 
the Code of Conduct and the Reputation Charter, they can be interpreted as follows. They 
should apply equally to all contributors, their rules should be known to all participants, its 
rules may not have consequences for established rights, its rules must be understandable to all 
participants, its rules ought not impose impossible demands on the participants, changes may 
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not drastically alter the Code and Charter, and the Reputation System should follow the 
principles laid down in the Code and the Charter. 
 
 
5.2. The Rules of Collaboration 
 
A viable set of collaboration rules should, we assume, comply with Fuller’s set of 
minimum criteria. Additionally, it should afford the specific aims of the collaborative 
enterprise. We first provide an example of the way the four parts of regulative system are 
filled in in the particular case of legal knowledge dissemination.  
 
Collaboration Mission  
The mission of collaboration is to find solutions for legal problems and to communicate 
them in such a manner that they are useful and understandable to our target group. 
 
Code of Conduct 
(1)  Each member of the collaborative environment has the right to articulate his or her 
own opinion at any stage of the collaborative activity. 
(2)  Each member of the collaborative environment has the duty to contribute to the 
mission of the collaborative activity. 
(3)  Each member of the collaborative environment has the duty to clarify contributions 
sufficiently for other participants. 
(4)  The members of the collaborative environment together establish the rules of the 
Code of Conduct by a qualified majority of votes. 
(5)  The compliance between the Reputation Charter and the Reputation System is 
warranted by  
a.  the fact that the Reputation System is built and maintained by people outside the 
circle of members; 
b.  the institution of an independent Reputation Board checking the compliance. 
(6)  All changes in the Code of Conduct must comply with the following criteria: 
a.  they must be general in nature, and may thus not be aimed at only certain 
contributors; 
b.  they must be made known in clear terms to the community before they are made 
effective, and their effect may not have retroactive effects; 
c.  they must be consistent with other rules of the Code and the Charter, unless these 
inconsistent rules are revoked; 
 
Reputation Charter 
(1)  The Reputation System is meant to reward wise and useful contributions to the 
Collaborative Mission. 
(2)  The Reputation Charter may only be changed by a normal majority of votes. 
(3)  The workings of the Reputation System must comply with the Reputation Charter. 
(4)  Discussions and their constitutive elements, as well as their specific roles in 
collaboration, are assessed according to the criteria reliability, truth, coherence, and 
justification. 
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(5)  Participants in the collaborative environment decide to what degree elements and 
roles are true, coherent and justified. 
(6)  The reliability of elements and roles is calculated on the basis of the valuations.  
 
Reputation System 
The reputation system is discussed in more detail in section 3.2. It connects entity types 
and epistemic roles to the four ‘knowledge criteria’. By leaving it up to the participants in a 
collaborative environment to assess each other’s contributions, a network of interrelated 
values comes into existence. Starting from identical starting positions (‘neutral’ reliability 
values of 0.5), participants have to attach values to the coherence and justification of entities 
and roles. In a fictive example concerning the example of knowledge dissemination explained 
above, the translation process includes the interpretation of sources of law. Introduction of 
statements about these sources allows the assignment of high values for their ‘truth’, as the 
statements generally are exact replicas of officially promulgated laws. The justification and 
reliability criteria become more important as the translation process progresses. Interpretation 
and simplification then may take their toll, and the quality of translation has to be monitored 
carefully.  
 
 
5.3. Reusing Reputation 
 
Many promises were made during the internet’s rapid growth in the late nineties. These 
promises regarded large-scale accessibility of products and services offered by small 
companies and individuals, because the distribution network was available to anyone. A few 
years later, we may conclude that only very few players survived, and the rules of traditional 
marketing still apply. Amazon and eBay became large players, whose value is largely 
dependent on their brand names. They have both become large network enterprises, housing 
many small companies and individuals who take advantage of the value of these companies’ 
brands. The on-line survival of such small companies depends on the presence of these large 
companies, which offer a kind of articulation service. Without the presence of a well-known, 
trusted company with adequate search facilities, it is relatively difficult to find a small 
supplier of a product and determine its credibility. It is important to realize that a similar 
concern is valid for almost any provider of services or goods on the internet, including the 
provision of legal information.  
Thus, in an on-line environment, trust is as important an asset as in the off-line world. 
Gaining a good reputation in a certain on-line environment would certainly gain attractiveness 
if you could take that reputation with you to other on-line (or even off-line) places. But is it 
necessary that such trust provision takes place by commercial enterprises, such as Amazon 
and eBay? Of course not. Public institutions provide trust. Building on traditional scholarly 
reputation mechanism research libraries enable open knowledge sharing  of publicly funded 
research by repository technology and interoperable author-identifiers. To a certain extent this 
can provide for citizens’ information needs. Given their goal to support internal scholarly 
discussion, translational steps have to be taken to meet the needs of net-citizens and 
innovative entrepeneurs. This can be done in collaborative environments. Wikipedia and 
Flickr, for instance, may be ideal candidates for both (extending their) reputation systems and 
exchanging the profiles from those. The value of a reputation profile in one of these 
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communities for a fair assessment of one’s reputation in another community may depend on 
the degree of relationship between the subjects of the two communities, but the simple fact 
that you do not have to enter each new community ‘empty handed’ could mean a great deal to 
the spread of participation across communities, and the quality of contributions.  
There is a flip-side to this coin, namely in potential privacy breaches. But as much as 
storing and using personal information is considered a privacy risk, there are major 
advantages in ‘being known’ by other people. If you wish to sell your old tv set, the price you 
will get is higher if the buyer knows that you do not lie about its age or existing defects. If 
you want a loan, the rate you will get it for will be lower if the bank knows that you always 
pay back in time. To push it a little further: if you are looking for a relationship, you might 
benefit from relatively objective information about a person’s past. In social network 
software, this is implemented using the principle: ‘a friend of a friend of mine is a friend of 
mine’. This is most likely not true, but still, the advice of others can contribute to a better 
grounded opinion. Detaching information from its original use environment could thus, in 
principle, support many aspects of daily life. We coin the term ‘portable reputation profiles’ 
for such detached information. If anyone could re-use reputation information built up in 
certain contexts, this would enable, for instance, a part-time eBay-seller who also discussed 
consumer law issues on a separate legal forum to let his merits on both platforms strengthen 
his reputation profiles on both platforms mutually. 
It need not be necessary to reveal one’s identity in order to support portability of 
reputation profiles. A fixed pseudo-identity can be established through a trusted third party, 
which links Jones’ nickname to his personal data with the assurance that he is the one who the 
reputation profile applies to. Such personal data can also be linked to arbitrary nicknames, 
that Jones can use in any context that he wishes to leave traces in, but does not want to be 
linked to his personal data – unless he authorizes such a link. For instance, Jones could wish 
not to reveal to the internet community that he deals in furniture, because he is afraid his 
house will be visited by thieves or because he is afraid he will lose his job over it. Then again, 
if Jones wants to start his own internet shop, leaving eBay out, he may profit from reusing his 
existing feedback profile. But the current business model of eBay of course excludes that 
possibility. Technically, it need not be a problem to guarantee the authenticity of portable 
reputation profiles, through a mechanism similar to that for authentication. Economically, 
however, the value of keeping those profiles as proprietary content is considerable – and in 
theory, portable reputation profiles could mean the end of eBay, as any successful client 
would be able to take his feedback and ‘move’ to an auction site where transaction costs are 
lower. 
 
 
5.4. Challenges for Reputation-based Collaboration 
 
Reputation systems tend to trigger calculating behaviour. Any framework whose rules are 
fixed will suffer from this, and frameworks whose rules can change will still find a hard time 
in keeping ahead of such behaviour – unless the calculative nature of behaviour actually 
furthers the successful completion of tasks. The regulative mechanism set out in this section 
is designed to lead to stable behaviour in collaborative environments, but it has not been 
tested yet. Also, the stability of an environment depends very much on the publics involved, 
and the question whether it is open to uninvited participants. Consequently, participants have 
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to accept the ‘meta-level’ introduced by the Code of Conduct and the Reputation Charter as 
part of their collaborative work, and actually use the assessment opportunities to make it 
work. For that matter, it would be interesting to find out in what cases a collaborative 
environment functions like a stable ‘social order’ without any sanctioning or reputation 
system, compared to the situation in which groups in real life usually tend to behave – not 
only without breaking the law, but also in observing some minimum social rules. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Reputation systems are a viable way of improving the quality of on-line collaboration. 
However, the specific tasks to be fulfilled in the on-line environment and the necessity to 
prevent virtual straitjackets from occurring trigger the need for a more serious investigation of 
the lawfulness of on-line collaboration. Considering on-line environments as small social 
orders with a need for ‘rule of law’ induces the necessity of establishing ‘constitutions’, in 
addition to ways of coping with the difference between ‘administration’ and ‘adjuciation’, 
which is warranted by an independent Reputation Board. The ‘social order’ can be changed 
by the participants in the collaborative environment, but those changes have to meet Fuller’s 
minimum requirements for ‘rule-of-lawness’. The task-oriented part of the collaborative 
environment – which consists of making legal issues understandable to a certain non-legally 
educated public – is regulated by a reputation system based on the value of knowledge. 
Criteria meant to determine whether mere belief ‘deserves’ the predicate ‘knowledge’ are 
used to assess the contributions and participants in the on-line environment. 
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